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BOOK REVIEWS
UNDERSTANDING Tin: SECURITIES ACT AND THE S. E. C. By Edward T.
McCormick. New York: American Book Company. Pp. 327. $7.50.
JAMES Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson in 1791: "St6ck and scrip
the sole domestic subjects of conversation . .. speculation . . . carried on with
money borrowed from two and a half per cent a month to one per cent a
week." Madison's words would have applied as well in 1929 as they did then
except that money, twenty per cent on call, was a bit cheaper. And the warning
words printed in the New York Advertiser of August 9, 1791, would have
been even more applicable: "The National Bank Stock has risen so high, so
enormously above its real value, that no two transactions in the annals of his-
tory can be found to equal it."
But the crash of 1792 is remembered solely by students of financial history.
Few people recall or talk about the slumps of 1897, 1907, 1921 or 1938. People
were financially ruined then just as they were ruined in 192 9 -only not so
many people. And hard on the heels of each market collapse came spasmodic,
"remedial" legislation aimed at practices detectable by even the most casual
observer. But 1929 was something different. New rulers of the financial roost
like Mike Meehan, the Fisher brothers, Jesse Livermore, and Harry Content
operated in the stock market, never center of the nation's financial structure, on
a scale never dreamed of before. These mystery men of Wall Street destroyed
all precedent and tradition, and they took all industry as their field. They
ushered in an era of major manipulation, of tidal movements in speculation, of
pools and syndicates so enormous that the operating combines of other days
were dwarfed to toy proportions. The outmoded machinery of the New York
Stock Exchange collapsed under the strain of keeping pace with the "greatest
bull market in history."
But the greatest of all bull markets was followed by the loudest of all
crashes. Spasmodic, plug-gap legislation was no longer the answer. Something
big had happened and something bigger was necessary to prevent its recurr;nce.
Congress had two alternatives: It could take over the New York Stock Ex-
change and all other exchanges; or it could deal with securities as it had dealt
with railroads in the past--i.e., set up a regulatory commission, a cop to watch
over the securities markets. Congress chose the latter course, and enacted the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Securities
and Exchange Commission, was set up as the agency to administer these acts.
It is the work of this commission and the administration of the 1933 Act that
McCormick depicts in his Understanding The Securities Act and The S. E. C.
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McCormick, at present Assistant Director of S. E. C.'s Corporate
Finance Division, is well qualified to write such a book. Graduate work in
economics at Duke University provided him with a theoretical background.
Membership on the S. E. C. staff almost since its inception coupled with
C. P. A. practice have given him a practical working knowledge. Impartial
readers of his book will be quick to agree that it reflects an admirable inter-
lacing of theory and practice.
Laws dealing with the issuance and trading of securities are not new. Such
legislation has almost without exception met with bitter resistance when in-
troduced, especially by those pseudo-champions of "free enterprise." But,
as McCormick points out, passage of the 1933 Act was advocated not only by
New Dealers but by the majority of the traditionally Republican brokerage
fraternity as well. After the 1929 debacle, it was easy for the Monday morn-
ing quarterbacks of finance to blame the stock market for the collapse and
ensuing depression. Such a view, however, made about as much sense as as-
cribing a cold wave to a drop in temperature. Wiser heads knew that the Mar-
ket merely registers, and does not cause, what takes place in the realm of busi-
ness profits and losses. An answer that made more sense, at least to Congress,
was the method in which the Market was operated. Under this heading were
such other answers as unfair trading practices, unlimited credit in security
transactions, and inadequate information to the public.
The real purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 was to place the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth before prospective buyers of a new se-
curity before its actual sale to the public. In determining the scope of the
1933 Act Congress again had two alternatives. First, it could create an agency
with power to tell who what to sell. In short, such an agency could say to a
corporation, promoter, or broker: "You can sell only bonds and preferred
shares to the public." Or-"You can sell only bank stocks and chemical
stocks-no others." The second alternative, adopted by Congress, was to
permit brokers, promoters or corporations to sell anything to the public as
long as the truth was told about the type of security being sold. In effect, if
you state the nature of the company's business, what its earnings picture has
been, how much money is going to promoters, and so on-if you tell all
these things truthfully, then no matter how much the truth hurts, you can
sell anything to the public.
The theory behind this choice was that if the public knew all the facts, it
would not be deceived and it would buy or not buy accordingly. The theory
sounded good. But it hasn't worked out. Here is why it hasn't worked out.
The SEC requires that all of the facts be gathered together in a document
known as the registration statement. Later, on the basis of this statement, a
prospectus is issued. It in turn is checked and re-checked for truth and
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accuracy. The prospectus is then made available to the public. There is nothing
in it that could possibly mislead even a child.
The only trouble is that nobody bothers to read it-that is, except the
SEC and a relatively few brokers and investment bankers.
Sure, it contains the truth. But who wants to read the truth in a 78-page
document with fine print? Can you persuade an Italian barber to read it?
Or a scrubwoman? Or a hurried businessman? The worst of it is that the
truth often hurts. The prospectus, on page 69, discloses that the ABC corpora-
tion has been losing money for the last 27 years. There have never been any
dividends paid, probably never will be. There is a huge bonded debt. And so
on.1 But Sam the garageman doesn't want to wade through 78 small-type
pages to find this out. All he wants to know is, "Did it get by the SEC?" If
the SEC "approved" it, then it must be all right. Of course, the SEC has
never approved the soundness of any security. The prospectuses even say that.
But these precautions are in vain. The public still believes that when the sale
of a security has been permitted by federal authorities, it has in some sense
been approved and is therefore "safe."
What can be done ?-"The only thing the SEC can do under the law is to
disclose all the facts to the public . . . the SEC should not inject itself into
what a fellow can or cannot sell to the public." That is the answer of former
SEC Chairman Ganson Purcell. "Congress hasn't given us permission to
outlaw speculation." That is the answer of former Commissioner Robert E.
Healy. "We can see that the dice aren't loaded, but we can't save a fool from
his folly." And that was the answer of former SEC Chairman, now Supreme
Court Justice, William 0. Douglas. There is, of course, the other alternative,
the one Congress didn't adopt ("telling a fellow what he can or cannot sell
to the public"). The Interstate Commerce Commission actually does this; it
tells the railroads what securities they can or cannot offer for public sale. To
give the SEC such power would require new legislation, however, and such
legislation is not yet in sight.
It is to be regretted that the author suggests no concrete proposals, short
of new legislation, for improved public safeguards. This writer submits that
the Commission could, under existing legislation, require that a simple two
or three paragraph statement on the pertinent facts of each new security
offered for sale in interstate commerce or by use of the mails be submitted
to every person inquiring about the purchase of that security. But if the author
is silent on suggestions for improvement here, he hits hard, and justifiably so,
in criticizing another weak spot in the 1933 Act-the "waiting" period.
1. For actual examples of how much. the truth often hurts, see Velie, Babes in Wall
Street, Collier's, April 27, 1946.
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Present legislation affords no means for adequate dissemination of informa-
tion to prospective investors during this period.2
After pointing out that this is a "valid criticism of the act," the author
specifically recommends that "the statute be amended to permit oral and
written offers during the waiting period provided the first written solicitation
takes the form of the complete statutory prospectus."
Part II of McCormick's book, Interpretation of Securities Act of 1933,
will be of most interest to lawyers, especially those who have only occasional
SEC business. This section of the book is handled adeptly by one who is not
himself an attorney. Treatment of registration and both criminal and civil
liability under the Act is as well stated as it is exhaustive. Decisions are
adequately cited and analyzed, a feature rarely present in the work of a layman.
The "Truth in Securities" Act is over fifteen years old. To the writer's
knowledge McCormick's book is the first authoritative treatment of the Act
in operation. Needless to say, Wall Street lawyers will find this book a must.
But the Main Street lawyer and the student of law and business will also benefit
greatly from the research and analysis it contains.
HUGH L. SOWARDS PROFESSOR OF LAW,
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI
How TAX LAWS MAKE GIVING TO CHARITY EASY. By J. K. Lasser. New
York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1948. Pp. 81. $3.00.
THE nationally known tax expert, Mr. J. K. Lasser, has written this
book in order to "strengthen the hands" of those soliciting charitable contri-
butions "by giving them essential tax information." For the great majority
-of these solicitors, the information contained in the introduction would prob-
ably be sufficient, and this writer doubts that the efforts expended by Mr.
Lasser are justified from a consideration of the limited use which can be
made of this small but thorough text. Unless one is soliciting funds from
those having incomes of more than $15,000 much of the information is of
doubtful applicability.
Be that as it may, this volume is a useful addition to the tax attorney's
library. The author makes very clear the truth that charitable contributions
come off the "top layer" of income; that is, a man whose tax rate is 25%
pays less than 75 on every dollar he donates to charity, and his thorough
discussion of all the facets of charitable contributions is valuable when
advising the client who has a real problem in this field. Many useful hints
are contained herein, too, for persons who may have unusual financial situ-
2. See Bates, The Waiting Period under the Securities Act, 15 HARV. Bus. Rv.
203-205 (1937).
